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Abstract                                                                         
Broadly defined, manipulation is a kind of covert behavior or a 
means, whether linguistic or non- linguistic, used by manipulators in 
certain communicative encounters to achieve their goals, desires, and 
interests regardless of the perceptual, cognitive , and emotional feelings 
of their interlocutors. In this regard, they utilize myriad devices, 
especially those dishonest ones, like cunning, lying, making tricks, 
deceiving, and the like. To be successful in doing so, manipulators 
should have a cognition which enables them to pursue their own interests 
through making use of some aspects of human cognition, notably 
reasoning, checking for likeliness, and emotions. As such, manipulators 
play on their targets’ weaknesses to influence their motivation, beliefs, 
emotions, and reaction. For some scholars, manipulation is a 
psychologicalissuebecause it can be considered as a kind of human 
behavior or cognition. For others, it falls within the region of cognitive 
pragmatics since it is basically based on the use of cognition in relation to 
context. In this study, as far as language use is concerned, it is argued 
that manipulation is more pragmatic than psychological in nature. 
Besides, it is characterized by pragmatic features other than the cognitive 
ones. Hence, it is felt, here, that there is a need to reveal those pragmatic 
aspects to locate its treatment in its right place. This is done by means of 
identifying the relationship between manipulation and various pragmatic 
theories and issues. 
 ﺚﺤﺒﻟﺍ ﺺﺨﻠﻣ  
 ا   وأ  و وا ا كا  عم ا  اا ه
ا تا  نا ا وأ ا   
 او طا ا  ا  و رو اا غ
ا   ن قا ا و.مط  ارداو  و 
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 ذ  ا و. و عااو او باو ا   ا
 ل  ا      ذ ا نا ا 
 او ا ءا  ظ و ا ا    عما
 و را   م  نا  لاا ا و.طاا
 ن دأ  أ.ا دودرو طاو اراو اود   اا
 كا وا ا اا  م م م  ا  ا
ا قم   ا ن ا  أو.يا ةر م ا وا
 رو ا ار أو.ق   ا لا   ا
   ا أ.م  ا وا   ا ل ا 
 ا   ىا وا ت  ا نا  ارا ه 
ا  ا ه  ا  را   و .ا وا
  ا  ل   او ا م  ا  ا
او ةا واا تاو او ا                                                          .                    
1. Introduction 
People are conceived as complicated human beings, exhibiting an 
extremely wide range of behaviors that result from an equally wide 
variety of causes. One of these behaviors is their appeal to manipulation. 
What drives them to such a kind of behavior is their desire to achieve 
certain goals regardless of what kind of means they make use of in this 
regard. In other words, they utilize myriad means which are available at 
their disposal to influence the behavior of othersby stimulating 
their(other’s) perceptual, cognitive, and emotional feelings. For many 
scholars( cf. for example Braiker2004 and Maillat and Oswald 
2009),manipulation is believed to be a psychological issue.However, it is 
also believed that it should be pragmatically approached; yet, this view 
limits itself to ‘cognitive pragmatics’ (cf.,for example de saussure2oo5). 
This means that other pragmatic issues which do not fall in the region of 
‘cognitive  pragmatic’are not taken into consideration. Hence, it is felt 
that there is a need to reveal as many of the pragmatic aspects of 
manipulation as possible to locate its treatment in its right place. In this 
study, as far as language use is concerned, it is believed that 
manipulationismorepragmatic than psychological in nature. Hence it sets 
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itself the task to reveal this particular nature of it. Nevertheless, a 
background idea about the notion itself is felt to be necessary before 
embarking on revealing its pragmatic nature. This latter task, i.e. 
revealing the pragmatic nature of manipulation, is done by studying it 
through its relation to various pragmatic theories and notios in order to 
shed light on the pragmatic mechanism which manipulators recourse to 
when they intend to manipulate others. 
2.Manipulation: An Overview 
Goodin (1980:59) has first defined the term manipulation as “a 
deceptive and covert influence adopted by a speaker (a manipulator) 
tointentionally and directly affect someone’s beliefs, desires,and/or 
emotionsin ways typically not in his self-interest or,at least, not in his 
self-interest in the present context.” Consequently, the manipulator’s 
beliefs, desires,and emotionsdominate. 
Like Goodin, Ware (1981: 149)defines manipulation as a kind of 
covert influence of the speaker on the manipulated person who has no 
knowledge of, or does not understand, the ways by which the 
manipulator affects his choices (ibid). Viewing manipulation as such 
makes it possible for many scholars to see the whole process as a 
pragmatic one that achieves its goals without evident detection of the 
communicative covert intention. In such manipulative situations, as 
Tarasov (1990: 26) asserts, the speaker wittingly chooses a form of 
utterance which lacks direct clues of his intentional situation. This can be 
recognized when the hearer cannot grasp the hidden intentions of the 
speaker behind what is actually being said. Hence, the use of 
manipulation in this way breaches Grice’s (1975, 1989) ‘quality’ maxim 
since the manipulator behaves insincerely to influence his interlocutor 
without letting the latter notice that. 
Rather than covert influence, some theorists analyze manipulation as 
a kind of defective persuasion. Mills (1995), for instance, specifies that 
what is distinctive about manipulation is that it purports to be legitimate 
persuasion that offers good reasons, but in fact, bad reasons are offered 
(ibid: 111).In a later work, Blass (2006) defines manipulation as a kind of 
deception, and that it is an attempt to influence the target in such a way 
that his behaviour or action is used as a tool to achieve the manipulator’s 
goals. The latter, in his turn, acts, unforced, in such a way that the hearer 
(his target) does not discern the former’s actions (ibid: 187). In fact, this 
view of Blass (ibid) is a combination of those of Goodin (1980) and 
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Trasov (1990) since it includes expressions such as those of ‘deception’ 
and ‘influence the target’.   
As such, manipulation is definitely a form of deception due to its 
covert nature. In language use, Blass (ibid) confirms that “it is quite 
acceptable to say: “Can I persuade you to …..?” But it is very odd to say 
“Can I manipulate you to …… ? ” This makes the hidden nature of 
manipulation obvious. (ibid: 188). At most, Blass’s definition of 
manipulation is based on McCornack’s (1992) earlier work of 
“Information Manipulation Theory” (henceforth, IMT). This theory was 
first developed as an extension of Grice’s (1975, 1989) work of 
‘conversational implicature’. According to this theory, Jacobs (1994: 22) 
suggests that in order to persuade or deceive, the manipulator 
intentionally breaks out/flouts one (or more) of the conversational 
maxims.  (ibid) 
As such, this theory brings to the forefront the idea that manipulation 
has two forms: deception and persuasion. McCornack's (1992) work 
takes Grice's theory to a new level and extends it to deceptive 
communication. He (ibid: 223) states that "manipulative messages are 
deceptive in that while they constitute deviations from the principles 
underlying conversational understanding, they remain covert deviations". 
The person who is being manipulated does not know that the information 
is being manipulated. Thus, IMT, based on Grice’s theory of implicature, 
proposes that deception involves the manipulation of information so as to 
generate false implicatures (Jacobs, 1994: 200).  It argues that “in 
ordinary conversations, individuals monitor the information that they 
divulge along four various primary dimensions: amount, veracity, 
relevance, and clarity" (ibid: 19). Sahlman& Canary (1996: 18) here, 
make a positive contribution to the theory by pointing out that IMT 
requires that the violation must be unrecognizable by the hearer and that 
is quite enough for one maxim to be violated in order to be considered as 
deceptive.  
In fact, various attempts by many scholars to expound the notion of 
manipulation within a linguistic framework can be recognized. Danler 
(2005: 63), for instance, states that language use is subjective and that 
everything, including manipulation, can be linguistically expressed. For 
this reason manipulation, in his view, is at least to a certain degree, 
inherent in ‘language in use’(ibid). Another clarification for the notion of 
manipulation is given by de Saussure (2005) who points out that literally, 
to manipulate,  is to use one’s hands to make  an object as an instrument 
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to fulfill things and actions (to operate or control by skilled use of the 
hands), and sometimes to change the object’s original shape. 
Accordingly, to manipulate a human being meansusing him/her, i.e. 
having him/her adopt specific behaviors, to fulfill the needs and interests 
of the manipulator, regardless of the ones of the manipulated (ibid). But 
an individual, he (ibid: 12) adds, contrarily to an object, has a cognition 
that enables him to pursue his own interests; therefore, a manipulator first 
of all manipulates some aspects of human cognition, notably reasoning, 
checking for likeliness, emotions, etc. (ibid). 
In this regard, two views are introduced by de Saussure (2005: 136) 
in relation to manipulative discourse. First, manipulative discourse can be 
a type of discourse, therefore, identifiable through formal features. 
Second, manipulative discourse can be a type of language use (ibid). 
Actually,  his (ibid: 137) justification for the former view is that  if 
manipulative discourse is a discourse type, like narration, theatre play or 
fairy tale, then either some linguistic forms can be found only in 
manipulative discourses, or manipulative discourses are sustained by a 
unique type of structure, for example, specific argumentative structures. 
In both cases, these particularities would provide a formal ground for 
manipulative discourse identification (ibid). 
Moreover, Van Dijk (2006a: 360) clarifies that manipulation is a 
communicative and interactional practice, in which a manipulator 
exercises control over the audience, usually against their will or against 
their best interests. This may justify why in daily usage, the concept of 
manipulation has negative associations – manipulation is bad – because 
such a practice violates social norms (ibid). This leads Lillian (2008: 14) 
to argue that receivers of manipulative utterances would be “unconscious 
of the linguistic structures affecting their perceptions than are 
speaker/hearers of any other forms of discourse.'' 
  On the basis of the views mentioned above, recent attempts are 
made to deal with manipulation as a linguistic act with a great creative 
potential (cf. Asya, 2013: 1).  She (ibid: 2) defines manipulation as “any 
verbal interaction regarded from the point of view of its motivation and 
realized by the subject (speaker) and the object (listener) of 
communication.” In this sense, manipulation may include such key 
elements as “negative” intention of the speaker (manipulator) and covert 
character of influence and masked layer of linguistic data that is not 
easily segregated from informational content (ibid).  
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Another attempt in this regard is made by Coons & Weber (2014:59) 
who observe that manipulation carries strong connotations of cunning 
and it characteristically happens unbeknownst to its victim.  Moreover, 
they (ibid: 9) point out that manipulation is deceptively influencing 
someone against his putative will,and assert the unprecedented fact that 
what is distinctive about manipulation as a form of influence is not its 
involvement of distinctive means, i.e., covert means of influence or bad 
arguments disguised as good arguments, but rather, it has a distinctive 
effect on its target, that is to say, it plays on the target’s weaknesses or it 
influences him without improving his understanding (ibid: 46). 
Another attempt in accounting for manipulation identifies three 
distinct kinds of manipulation:(1)the manipulation of options(in which 
options in the environment are modified by increasing or decreasing 
available options or by rewards or threatening punishments); (2)the 
manipulation of information(in which the person’s perception of options 
is modified by non-persuasively affecting the person’s understanding of 
the situation); and (3)psychological manipulation(in which the person is 
influenced by causing changes in mental processes other than those 
involved in understanding) (Faden& Beauchamp, 2014: 70). 
3. Manipulation Parameters 
The term‘parameter’ , here , is used to refer to the four components of 
manipulation in a manipulative encounter. These parameters, namely: the 
target (hearer), intention, covertness and speaker’s interest, are 
considered to be as the four manipulation prerequisites, without which, 
manipulation process will be defeated. 
a.The Target (Hearer):  Manipulation, as Rudinow (1978: 102) notes, is 
geared towards influencing the target (hearer) to operate in a direction 
that under normal circumstances he would likely oppose. Besides, many 
manipulative strategies are designed in manipulation process to lead the 
target to act in a way that is not compatible with his intentions, 
motivations, and best interests. Generally speaking, it might be seen that 
the veteran manipulator strives to pry, interfere, and influence the 
decision-making process of the target by giving the latter an impression 
that he (the target) chooses his actions freely and independently, as he  
(ibid: 106)appends. To achieve this effect, the manipulator attempts to 
maneuver the target to perceive the ‘‘intentional action’’ (i.e., the 
manipulator’s goal) as the best available option in the current situation 
(Goodin, 1980: 8).  
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  However, a manipulative situation can also be seen from another 
perspective. For Phillips (1997: 18), manipulative interaction invites a 
meeting between opposing positions: the manipulator’s and the target’s 
ones. However, the meeting, or more precisely the clash, is mostly 
indirect, invisible, and covert. This effect is created by the trickery that is 
intrinsic to manipulative behavior. The use of morally questionable 
means, such as seduction, misdirection, and intimidation, contribute to 
the elusive feature of manipulation (ibid). Such means are used, in 
Galasinski’s (2000: 22) view, “if the target had access to all information 
relevant in given communicative information, manipulation would be 
impossible”.   
In order to be successful,as Baron (2003: 48) specifies, the 
manipulator feeds the target with false information. This can be done via 
different manipulation strategies. For instance, ‘Manipulation by means 
of lying’ strategy does this in an obvious way; on the basis of which he 
(the target) makes choices he might not have made if he had known the 
truth. As such, it seems that the essence of manipulation process is 
basically withholding information and controlling it. 
Viewed from the target’s angle, van Dijk (2006: 375) believes that in 
a way or another,targets need to be defined as lacking crucial resources to 
resist, detect or avoid manipulation. Crucially, this may 
involve:incomplete or lack of relevant knowledge,fundamental norms, 
values and ideologies that cannot be denied or ignored, strong emotions, 
that make people vulnerable; andsocial positions, professions,  and status 
that induce people into tending to accept speaker’sargument. In addition, 
he (ibid: 377) asserts that these are typical conditions of the cognitive, 
emotional or social situation of the communicative event, and also part of 
the context models of the participants 
Actually, one can see that this end could be achieved because, in a 
manipulative situation (including the contextual factors), the 
manipulator’s spectrum of vision is larger than the target’s; which means 
that the manipulator knows more. Subsequently, the manipulator seeks to 
maneuver the target to consider possible actions that he (the target) 
refuses to examine.  
A more recent viewpoint compatible with the previous ones is 
presented by Coon&Weber (2014: 35) who assure that in a manipulative 
situation, the targetwho believes that he chooses the best available option 
freely and independently is actually subject to invisible interference in 
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his judgment and critical thinking. As such, the result is a successful 
manipulation. 
b. Intention 
The second crucial parameter in the characterization of manipulation 
is that it is always intentional on the part of the speaker; manipulation 
cannot happen accidently, i.e., unintentionally, as Blass (2005: 12) 
confirms.Consequently, in a typical manipulative situation, the 
manipulator’s covert intention cannot be grasped by the hearer; 
otherwise, manipulation would be self-defeating. Moreover, the concept 
of intention receives an eminent interest in many pragmatic theories. 
Relevance theory, for instance, as approached by Sperber& Wilson 
(1995: 80) admits two levels of intention on the part of the speaker, 
which must be acknowledged by the hearer in order for the interpretive 
process to take place: First, the relevance-theoretic idea of ostensive-
inferential communication involves the need for the hearer’s 
identification of the speaker’s communicative intention; the speaker 
makes it clear to the hearer that the stimulus is intended to communicate 
something to him. This kind of identification triggers expectations of 
relevance (the expectation that the utterance is adequately formatted to 
communicate relevant assumptions at a lower interpretative cost), and 
therefore allows for inferential processing to begin (ibid). 
Second, the communicated message is not simply decoded but is 
pragmatically enriched (following a deductive non-demonstrative scheme 
of information processing). The full interpretation is a set of assumptions 
corresponding to what the speaker ‘means’ by the utterance. This set of 
assumptions represents the informative intention of the speaker, and 
includes all relevant propositions derived during the interpretative 
process (ibid: 81). 
 The centrality of a deceptive intention in manipulation bridges the 
gap between theories of argumentation and pragmatic account which 
consider intention as a central aspect of communication (particularly in 
the field of Gricean pragmatics, as Carston ,2002: 113) assures. 
c. Covertness 
The other intuitive and widespread view on manipulation holds that in 
order to succeed, the manipulative attempt must remain covert. 
Otherwise, manipulationwill fail.Maillat&Oswald(2009:8-28) specify 
that ‘The overall manipulative intention, Local and Global linguistic 
strategies’, as well as‘Discursive strategies’are all elements that may 
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remain covert in a manipulative utterance.Thus, it is obvious that many 
aspects of verbal communication can remain covert by the manipulator. 
d. Speaker’s Interest 
  The last parameter of manipulation is that of speaker’s interest. The 
notion of interest has been highlighted by many researchers as one key 
feature of manipulation. The claim is that manipulation is an intrinsically 
goal-oriented phenomenon designed to satisfy speaker’s interest (de 
Saussure & Schulz, 2005: 126).de Saussure (2005: 119) also emphasizes 
the connection between speaker’s interest and the manipulative attempt: 
Communication is manipulative when the speaker retains some 
relevant information, or provides the correct information in order for the 
hearer to conclude that he should behave in a way which favors the 
speaker’s interests, without being aware of it.  
This means that,as van Dijk (2006: 360) argues, manipulators make 
others believe or do things that are in the interest of the manipulator and 
against the best interests of the target. 
4. The Central Mechanisms of Manipulation 
Manipulation, according to Asya (2013: 4), is based upon 
mechanisms that compel the listener to perceive verbal messages 
uncritically and facilitate creation of illusions and misperceptions 
impacting target’s emotions and making him fulfill actions beneficial for 
the manipulator.  
Among all these mechanisms, as she (ibid: 150) states, linguistic ones 
are crucial for the manipulator to obtain sincere consent. More 
specifically, of all linguistic ones, fuzziness, in a wide sense, plays an 
important role in the process of manipulating. These ideas are based on 
previous ones introduced by other scholars. In this regard, for instance, 
the concept of fuzziness has been previously explained by Stalnaker2002: 
25). For him (ibid), fuzziness is not only about vague terms, complicated 
sentences and overuse of metaphors. One of the most important 
mechanisms used within manipulative discourses is the creation of a 
global fuzziness, where even parts of the discourse that seem clear and 
simple lead to interpretative problems for the addressee (ibid). 
Besides, as Rocci (2005: 115) states, simplificationandfallacies as 
other manipulation mechanisms. According tothis view,simplistic, and 
usually inductive and false arguments violating logical rules, and which 
create unmotivated generalizations, can be considered as contributing to 
the global fuzziness or confusion of the discourse, in spite of the fact that 
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they are intended to imply a particularly clear and wise thinking. In many 
other cases, he (ibid: 222) points out, the trouble does not arise from 
simplification and fallacies but from obscure, vague, metaphorical and 
mystical expressions. The target faces a conundrum: on the one hand, his 
natural ability to understand clearly is defeated, and, on the other hand, 
he is keen to believe in the manipulator’s word, because of these non-
propositional (emotional) effects, combined with the constant request, on 
the manipulator’s side, to have faith in him. 
One more word should be said about emotional appeals in 
manipulation. Quite often, the discourse is accompanied by other 
emotional devices than prosody and intonation. Emotions are also 
triggered by devices at the level of the general attitude of the speaker, 
and relative to the propositional contents of the utterances, as when the 
manipulator speaks about concepts that call for fear and hope 
(Richard&Perloff, 2010: 71). In other words,   the target perceives the 
manipulator’s emotion, fallacious or real, which seems fair and 
motivated, since the manipulated person belongs to a group assumed to 
be integrated in a common fate with the manipulator, as such, the 
emotion either comes to be shared by the target or a related emotion is 
triggered (ibid: 77). In fact, the aforementioned mechanisms of 
manipulation process seem to imply the utilization of certain pragmatic 
manipulation strategies subsumed according to manipulation types to be 
totally accomplished.  
5. Manipulation Types 
Handelman (2009: 45) illustratively specifies that manipulative 
behavior is geared towards indirect interference in the decision-making 
of the target, usually without his / her approval.  It is not exactly 
coercion, persuasion or deception. This elusive phenomenon is settled 
somewhere in the gray area between these motivating actions. The 
vagueness of manipulation enables the process to appear in almost 
infinite forms and under many different guises (ibid) . 
According to this view, manipulation has been classified into 
different types, each with its own strategies among which are the 
following: 
a.Verbal Manipulation: is considered by Gardner (2006: 48) as 
using certain words, voice inflections and tones to control the person 
someone addresses. It seems that the basic premise is simple; however, 
there is a great deal of intricate human behavior involved in an effective 
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verbal manipulation.Differently, a more recent view of verbal 
manipulation given by Asya (2009: 1)characterizes verbal manipulation 
as a complex, multistage and phase-by-phase process (as in case of 
informational propaganda and politics),or it can be a singular, relatively 
simple act of influencing the target in the course of interpersonal 
communication. In accordance with this point of view, it seems that 
manipulation can be either a process with various stages or a product 
with a single stage. Verbal manipulation includes syntactic and lexico-
semantic manipulations. 
b.Psychological Manipulation 
This type is elucidated by Braiker (2004: 141) as a type of 
psychological influence that aims to change the intuitive cognition or 
behavior of others through duplicitous, deceptive, or even abusive 
strategies. He (ibid: 132) adds, by advancing the interests of the speaker 
(manipulator), usually at another's expense, such strategies could be 
considered exploitative, abusive, devious, and deceptive. This is so 
because psychological influence is generally perceived to be innocuous 
when it respects the right of the influenced person to accept or decline 
and is not unduly coercive (ibid).Successful psychological manipulation 
mainly involves the manipulator’s concealing fierce intentions and 
behaviors. This entails that the manipulator is fully acquainted with the 
psychological vulnerabilities of the target to determine what strategies 
are likely to be the most influential (ibid).de Saussure (2005:151) assures 
that the identification by the hearer of the manipulative intention of the 
manipulator and seeing whether it is possible  for  normal humans, 
equipped with rational devices, to stop using them correctly when 
confronted by an efficient manipulative situation is one of the crucial 
problems of manipulation. Thus, it is quite obvious that what is crucial in 
a manipulative situation is the fact that the goal of manipulators, 
whatever they themselves believe and regardless of their particular 
psychological condition, is to convince the hearer of a proposition or set 
of propositions that should be ruled out by normal information 
processing and reality checking (ibid). Viewing it differently, Maillat& 
Oswald (2009: 11) confirm that the crucial psychological aspect of 
manipulation lies in the way it constrains the hearer’s interpretative 
processes. Thus, an appropriate pragmatic model of manipulation must 
be proposed to shift the focus on and account for the cognitive 
(psychological) processes which underlie the interpretation of a 
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manipulative argument.  In line with the aforesaid view, this type of 
manipulation is the one via which  the speaker manipulates hearer’s 
beliefs, such as knowledge, judgements, sentiments and ideologies which 
in turn control his actions and this is the main concern of cognitive 
pragmatics .  
6. Manipulation and Context Selection  
It is necessary here to refer in this regard to Wilson’s  (2000: 411) 
supposition that in communicative interactions, specifically, in the 
cognitive processes of interpretation, the notion of context plays a 
decisive role in the meanings hearers may derive from the speaker’s 
linguistic productions.In line with Wilson (ibid), it has been claimed by 
Allott (2002) that manipulative communication takes advantage of the 
imperfect cognitive mechanisms of information processing (ibid: 156). 
 Information processing in communication is seen by Rohl (2004: 
19) as subjected to uncertainty and errors, if only because the hearer may 
end up selecting inappropriate contextual assumptions, and also to a 
resource-bound efficiency constraint balancing cognitive effort and 
contextual effects.  Antecedently, Sperber& Wilson (1995: 267) have 
seen contextual selection as having certain features. First, contextual 
selection is a dynamic process whose output is to be taken as a variable; 
the context of interpretation is not given, but constructed as the linguistic 
stimuli are processed by the hearer. In other words, the set of 
assumptions that will be selected for this purpose is the result of a 
cognitive calculation of some sort.   As a matter of fact, according to this 
relevance –Theoretic viewpoint, they (ibid) assume that this calculation 
operates by allocating cognitive resources to the mobilization of relevant 
information, following the economical constraint: the more cognitive 
effects a representation yields, the more relevant it will be; and 
consequently, the first representation to yield a satisfactory balance 
between effort and effect will be most likely selected (ibid: 272).    As for 
the second feature of contextual selection, it is the one which yields 
representations that adequately comply with this effort/effect trade-off. In 
other words, contextual selection privileges prominentrepresentations.  
As such, it is reasonable for the hearer to assume that the assumptions he 
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considers salient correspond to those the manipulator has had in mind at 
the time of his utterance by virtue of the default presumption of optimal 
relevance which, according to relevance theory, governs standard, 
cooperative, linguistic exchanges  (ibid: 276).       
A further point presented by relevance theory is that a context is a set 
of mental representations which are used as premises in the 
comprehension procedure. These representations may be concerned with 
various things: social relationships, events, concepts, linguistic items, 
mental states, general knowledge, perceptual evidence, etc. (Sperber et 
al., 1995: 31).  Accordingly, manipulation is seen as an attempt to control 
the context selection process of an utterance by making a set of 
assumptions so prominent so as to make them cognitively inevitable 
(ibid: 283).  In effect, there are mechanisms of contextual selection, and 
constraints that a speaker can impose through different means, notably by 
misleading the hearer, by resorting to different strategies, to select some 
cognitively unavoidable assumptions (Maillat& Oswald, 2009: 348).  
7. Pragmatic Theories and Manipulation 
Here, the major pragmatic theories are discussed in relation to 
manipulation. It is believed, by this work, that in so doing, the pragmatic 
nature of manipulation is revealed in most of its aspects. 
 To manipulate and to achieve influential goals, the speaker may use 
manipulative speech acts; breach the maxim(s) of cooperation; convey 
irrelevant information, utilize certain deictic expressions, maneuver; be 
engaged in fallacious arguments; be polite, and/or be impolite.  It is 
asserted by many scholars that communication can be studied from 
different perspectives. Thus, Archer et al (2012:8) sees that there is a 
tension between socio-cultural (communicative) and cognitive 
approaches to pragmatics. The cognitive approach can best be 
represented by relevance theory. The socio-cultural or socio-pragmatic 
perspective, on the other hand, focuses on how people use language in 
conversations, debates, speeches and the like. That is to say, how they 
use language to achieve their social goals.   As such, the socio-pragmatic 
perspective can be represented by a large variety of pragmatic theories. 
However, as far as manipulation is concerned,  socio-pragmatic 
perspective limits itself to be represented by some of the pragmatic 
concepts and theories including: speech act theory (henceforth, SAT), 
politeness/ impoliteness theory, conversational implicatures (henceforth, 
CI), relevance theory (henceforth, RT),  deictic expressions (henceforth, 
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DE), persuasive argumentation (henceforth, PA), strategic maneuvering 
(henceforth, SM), fallacies and Pragma-rhetoric. 
7.1   Speech Act Theory and Manipulation 
Central to Austin’s ( 1962) theory of SA is that utterances can be 
shown to have both illocutionary force and a perlocutionary effect in 
addition to their propositional content, that is, their meaning as 
locutionary acts (ibid: 38). Taking into account that manipulation is a 
communicative interaction process, manipulators, as such, exploit 
manipulative speech acts to achieve their goals. This is so owing to the 
fact that, for manipulators, sending a message is never the ultimate 
objective of communication, it is only a means of achieving other ulterior 
aims directed towards control of the target’s behavior.  
7.1.1 Manipulative Speech Acts 
When engaged in such a type of a conversational encounter, 
manipulators issue certain speech acts which are intended to manipulate 
their targets. These manipulative speech acts (henceforth, MSAs), are 
expressed via a variety of utterances which are used directly or indirectly 
to convey certain manipulative meanings that can create the intentional 
effect in the target.  Leontyev(1981: 273) specifies that when 
manipulating a person, we aspire to engineer his behavior according to 
our needs through finding week spots in his system of activity and affect 
them (ibid). In other words, the inducement towards proximal verbal or 
non-verbal reaction is coupled with a mediated manipulation aimed at 
formation of certain emotions, valuations, orientations on the part of the 
target that would be compatible with the intention of the manipulator 
(Sytnik, Krivulya, 1989: 90). Actually, this idea is based on an earlier 
remark given byMatveeva(1981: 6) which assumes that such orientations 
are supposed to lead to the organization of such behavior of the listener 
that the speaker counts for (ibid). 
To achieve manipulation in this way, the manipulator may resort to a 
direct subject- object interaction, i.e., the manipulator openly asserts his 
claims and demands to the target of manipulation. Alternatively, this kind 
of interaction can be approached indirectly. As such, it is not directed 
towards the target.Rather, it is directed  towards his environment 
(Leontyev, 1981: 282). For Leontyev (ibid: 283), the direct method of 
manipulation includes the forms that have a definite meaning in the 
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language system that directly expresses corresponding illocution, i.e. the 
communicative aim of the speaker. 
On the basis of such a kind of ideas and the belief that human speech 
is operative in its nature, a theory of speech manipulation has been 
developed. As such, in accordance with the aforementioned 
method,Zheltuhina(2004: 13) asserts that forms of the imperative mood 
are associated with the meaning of inducement, declarative and 
interrogative utterances are connected with illocutionary forces of the 
message and information of request. Conversely, indirect method of 
expressing communicative intention consists in the usage of linguistic 
forms to express illocutionary forces not connected with their direct 
linguistic meaning. Indirect forms, thus, express covert intensions of the 
manipulator (ibid). Hence, MSAs can be direct or indirect ones. 
7.1.1.1 Manipulative Direct Speech Acts 
Manipulative Direct Speech Acts (henceforth, MDSA), are identified 
by Ivanova (1981: 69) as follows with examples:  
1.Utterances containing lexical verb in the imperative form:  
(1):just think how difficult it is 
to save 50,000, 100,000, 
200,000 , a million, and then 
think of 6,000  million to be 
saved in the next nine months… 
(Brown in first prime minister 
debate 15 April 2010. BBC. 
News: online) 
The imperative speech act is clearly manifested in this utterance when 
Brown asks his hearers to think now in a sense of order. 
2.Utterances containing the verb ‘get’ in the imperative form. (see 
also Haimovich, 1967: 155): 
(2):There is got to be a right of recall for people 
who are in a constituency and find their MP’s 
corrupt and parliament doesn’t act. (Brown in first 
prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News: 
online) 
The imperative mood is obviously manifested in Brown’s utterance in the 
sense that recall corrupted MPs is an obligatory action that should be 
taken by every individual.  
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3.Utterances containing verb to be in the imperative form. (see also 
Veihman, 2000: 76): 
(3): We should all be frank. (Cameron in 
first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. 
BBC. News: online) 
The verb be here conveys an imperative meaning. 
4.Utterances containing the verb ‘let’ and a pronoun in the first 
person plural, indicating inducement towards cooperative action: 
(4):Let’s be honest with each other, net 
inward immigration is falling.  (Gordon 
Brown in first prime minister debate 15 
April 2010. BBC. News: online) 
The verb ‘let’ is clear in this example accompanied with first person 
plural to indicate the involvement of the speaker and the hearer in the 
same issue to assure their cooperative situation.  
7.1.1.2   Manipulative Indirect Speech Acts 
According to Akimova (1992:189), indirect MSAs (henceforth, 
MISAs), are also common in the framework of speech interaction. These 
are utterances, non-imperative in form, but always serve to express the 
meaning of inducement. This meaning of inducement is associated with 
these forms in the language system.In this regard, manipulation is based 
on the use of ISAs, which are focused on prelocutionary effects of what 
is said (ibid). 
akimova (ibid) classifies MISAs as follows:  
1.MISAs represented by utterances containing performative verbs, i.e. 
verbs that do not describe action, but are an action themselves, and this 
action is carried out through realization of this utterance: declare, 
promise, advise (ibid: 39). Consider the following example: 
(5): We’ve built up the police force from a period when it was under 
staffed to a period where they now have more police than ever before. 
(Brown in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News: online) 
This utterance can be extended by inserting declare or state as explicit 
performative SAs to be read as “I hereby declare or state that we’ve 
built…..” to show the declare SA. Whereas the following example shows 
promising SA: 
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(6): We’re going to make you politics better value for money as well as 
cleaner. (Cameron in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC 
News: online) 
This utterance consists of an implicit SA of promising that can be 
read, if extended by using an explicit performative verb as ‘I hereby 
promise to make your politics….’.  As for advice, consider the 
following example:  
(7): If your MP is misbehaving and is guilty of corrupt practices and 
parliament does not act you should have the right to recall that MP. 
(Brown in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News: 
online) 
     Here the speaker is advising people to behave accordingly by 
asserting that they have the right to do so.  
2. MISAs of inducement represented by utterances with verbs in the form 
of the indicative mood conveying the meaning of instruction. (ibid: 
41). Below is an illustrative example: 
(8): We’re going to cut minister’s pay by 5% and freeze it for the whole 
of the parliament. We’re going to cut the size of white whole by a 
third. And we’re going to get rid of some of these quangos. (Cameron 
in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News: online) 
      This utterance which is in the indicative mood exposes and conveys 
the sense of giving instructions to the government for the sake of 
making better economic situation. 
3.MISAs represented by utterances containing the verbs in the 
subjunctive mood. The illocutionary aim of such MISAs is formal 
request (sometimes with the tinge of pleading), inducement with 
promise or advice (ibid: 92). For example: 
(9): I need to point out that it is an area where powers are developed to 
the parliament in Scotland….. (Stewart in first prime minister debate 
15 April 2010. BBC. News: online) 
     This utterance contains the verb ‘need’ to indicate a formal request 
with a sense of desirability of the speaker to express his point of 
view. 
4.MISAs in the form of speech acts represented by utterances with 
suppose/supposing. Such utterances express advice, inducement for 
cooperative action or offer (ibid: 102). Consider the following 
example: 
(10): I’ve got to tell you when someone smashes up the bus stop, when 
someone repeatedly breaks the low, when someone’s found fighting 
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on a Friday or Saturday night, as a magistrate, you’ve got to have that 
power for a short prison sentence when you’ve tried the other 
remedies. (Cameron in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. 
BBC. News: online) 
Cameron’s utterance shows a supposition of an action that should be 
taken when someone improperly behaves. 
5.MISAs in the form of speech acts represented by utterances containing 
the verb of desire wish (ibid: 105). As illustrated in the example 
below: 
(11): I think it's great we're having these debates, and I hope they go 
some way to restore some of the faith and some of the trust into our 
politics, because we badly need that once again in this country. 
(Cameron in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC.News: 
online). 
6.MISAs of inducement represented by speech acts expressed by 
utterances with constructions indicating lack of necessity to commit 
an action (ibid: 106). As shown below: 
(12): I will stand with Israel if they are attacked. And this is the reason 
why, working with Israel, we have created the strongest military and 
intelligence cooperation between our two countries in history….. and 
if Israel is attacked, we have their back, not just diplomatically, not 
just culturally, but militarily. (Obama in a candidates debate, LYNN 
University in October 22, 2012) 
      Here the manipulative effect is manifested through Obama’s 
readiness to support and back up Israel if it has been attacked by any 
outsider force. Since Israel has not been attacked for the time being, 
so, there is no necessity to render any military or political assistance. 
     More recently, Brusenskayaet al (2005) make another classification 
including twenty-seven typesof  MISAs that might be used by 
manipulators. Below are the most relevant ones to this study:  
1.MISAs represented by utterances with modal verbs expressing a must, 
necessity, advise, order, command, request (the latest is often marked 
by please, kindly) (ibid: 133). The following example clarifies this 
point: 
(13): David, answer the question. (Brown in first prime minister debate 
15 April 2010. BBC. News: online) 
     This utterance is an order given by Brown to Cameron. It has an 
implicit performative verb if it is extended by inserting the verb order 
to be read as ‘I hereby order you to answer the question’. 
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2.MISAs in the form of the speech act of interrogation and 
represented by utterances with modal verbs can/could, will/would. 
Such MISAs express requests, requests with could and would being 
more polite than the requests with can and will  (ibid: 134). Consider 
the following example: 
(14):I’d be happy to have you take a look. (Romney in a candidates 
debate, LYNN University in October 22, 2012) 
3.MISAs in the form of the speech act of interrogation represented by a 
rhetorical question. Such MISAs express prohibition (ibid: 141). 
Look at the example below: 
(15): But do you know one thing I think we really need to do as part of 
the apology, is to say to the British people, we are going to cut the 
cost of politics. (Cameron in first prime minister debate 15 April 
2010. BBC. News: online) 
This interrogative utterance is actually not a real question though it starts 
with interrogation. But rather, it is a rhetorical one which functions as 
a means of showing prohibition of keeping MP’s payments as they 
are to express some kind of apology to British people. 
4.MISAs in the form of the speech act of interrogation expressed by 
special utterance with the word ‘why’ having the meaning of advice 
and used in order to induce the target to perform the correct action 
(ibid: 149). For example: 
(16):Well, I would agree with you that the Tories are damaging so that's 
why I would ask you to work with us, with us to bring an end to 
further Tory cuts and another Tory government.  (Leanne Wood in  
‘Opposition Parties Election Debate’, 16th April 2015, 8pm. BBC 
news: online). 
5.MISAs represented by indirect questions having the form ‘I + wonder’ 
(ibid: 152). Consider the following example: 
(17):I just wonder, I’m curious; can I get any recognition from any of 
you, that the demand side of this equation is that a rapidly rising 
population due to open-door immigration, started by Ed 
Miliband'sLabour Party in the late 1990s, has directly contributed 
towards the housing crisis? Is there any flicker of recognition from 
any of you? Please? One of you, have a go, please (Nigel Faragein 
‘Opposition Parties Election Debate’, 16th April 2015, 8pm. BBC 
news: online). 
6.MISAs expressed by declarative sentences with conditional clauses 
indicating positive and negative consequences of action completion 
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(in the latest case a speech act conveys a meaning of warning) (ibid: 
156). The following example will be serviceable: 
(18): And if you offer them work when they don’t have a work permit 
which says they are entitled to be in that region, then you are acting 
illegally. (Clegg in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. 
News: online) 
 This conditional utterance expresses warning as a negative 
consequence of the action of giving work to people who do not have 
a permission to work. In this case their action will be illegal. 
7.1.2   Manipulation and Truth and Felicity Conditions  
Truth and felicity conditions have been proposed as relevant criteria 
definingmanipulative strategies in terms of falsity and insincerity 
(Rigotti, 2005:67).Themain assumption behind this view is that some 
features of the manipulative message, in terms of the content it encodes, 
donot comply with the communicative standards of verbal interaction 
(ibid). 
Both truth and felicity conditions are useful in accounting for what 
happens in manipulative communicative encounters where what is 
covertly intended is hidden behind what is overtly expressed. 
In fact, ‘felicity’ is concerned with statements which directly twists 
the vision of reality in the target’s mind, it takes the formof 
disinformation when the manipulator controls thewhole (or, at least, a 
large part of the) communication systemand can thereforeavoid the risk 
of being contradicted by possible competitors (ibid). 
Typically, manipulation would fall under this category, since it is 
crucial for a manipulation’s success to be takenas a truthful statement. In 
other words, in a manipulation process, the manipulator misleads the 
hearer by providing him with a false statement while asserting it as a 
truth.   Previously, Parret (1978) has viewed the definition of 
manipulation within a speech-act-theoretic framework as causing a 
problem in the sense that the speech act of manipulation cannot comply 
with the principle of expressibility of Searle (1969) because it cannot be 
translated with an explicit performativesuch as “I manipulate you + 
propositional content”. All in all,  manipulation isa kind of speech act 
which is not meant to be recognized atall, not even indirectly (ibid: 351-
352).However, for Maillat& Oswald (2009: 351),  from a speech-act-
theoretical perspective, manipulation could be envisaged to considerthat 
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manipulation violates felicity conditions, and among them, the 
sinceritycondition in particular (ibid). 
7.2    Politeness Theory and Manipulation 
According to Brown and Levinson (1987), Politeness Theory is based 
on the premise that communicationis: constitutive of social relationships, 
and potentially aggressive, i.e., it may damage the face or self-image 
individuals want for themselves in a determinatesocio-cultural system. 
Consequently, they establish that communicators areexpected to soften or 
mitigate such face-threat inherent to communication in their 
interactionswith others in order to create, maintain, and enhance 
harmonious social bonds (ibid: 56). 
Hence, in their (ibid: 61) conceptualization of face (every individual's 
feeling of self- worth or self- image that can be damaged, maintained or 
enhanced through interaction with others), they distinguish between an 
individual's positive andnegative face, with the former referring to the 
desire to be approved of by others, and thelatter alluding to the desire to 
have freedom of action (ibid: 62).  
In this regard, it can be seen that manipulation and politeness are 
interrelated concepts.Politeness, seen as the linguistic codification of 
social bonds, necessarily entails the premisethat social relations cannot 
be stripped off communication coming into being in and through it. 
Taking into consideration that manipulation is a communicative 
phenomenonlike any other, it follows that when a speaker is trying to 
manipulate another, he is unavoidablyrelating to the latter at the same 
time. Speakers in attempting to persuade others employ mitigating 
strategies in their persuasive appeals, more specifically,positive and 
negative politeness strategies (pastor, 2011: 9). 
Bearing all these theoretical propositionsin mind and the results from 
their anthropological work, they(ibid: 63) devisea framework of 
conversational strategies they label “politeness strategies”participants are 
expected to use in their communicative exchanges with one another. As 
far as this study is concerned, these strategies are as follows:  
1. bald-on-record strategies:or highly direct conversational strategies 
that convey little concern for face and are normally deployed in 
emergency situations; 
2. Positive politeness strategies:which are aimed at mitigating 
threats to an individual's positive face; 
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3. negative politeness strategies:or strategies oriented to soften 
threats to a communicator's negative face; and  
4. off-record strategiesor highly indirect and implicit strategies such 
as hints, metaphors, etc. (ibid: 68). 
Of these strategies, only positive ones are relevant, in the sense that 
they play a pivotal role in manipulation process. They are heavily used 
by manipulators as powerful pragmatic strategies to achieve the intended 
manipulative end. They are as follows: 
1. Positive Politeness Strategies 
 Positive politeness strategies involve three broad 
mechanisms: 1)Claim common ground; 2)convey that S and H are 
cooperative; and 3)fulfil H’s want (for some x) (Brown and 
Levinson, 1987: 102). Only the first and second mechanisms will 
be tackled. 
a.  Claim a Common Ground 
   They (ibid: 103) list eight strategies for this mechanism; 
it involves both the speaker and the heareras belonging to a group 
of people who share specific wants, including goals and values. 
The speaker may convey that some want (goal, or desired object) 
of the hearer's is admirable or interesting to the speaker too, or he 
may stress common membership in a group, thus, emphasizing 
that both the manipulator and the target belong to some set of 
persons who share some wants.  As illustrated below: 
(19):One, more economic development. We 
should key our foreign aid, our direct foreign 
investment, and that of our friends, we 
should coordinate it to make sure that we – 
we push back and give them more economic 
development (Romney in a candidates’ 
debate, LYNN University in October 22, 
2012). 
This example shows that the speaker and the hearer are involved in 
the same issue. The manipulator considers himself as belonging to a 
group of people who share specific wants including goals and values. 
Romney here conveys some wants of the targets and shows his interest 
and affiliation to them. As far as this study is concerned, the following 
strategies are the most relevant ones: 
1.  Notice, attend, to H (his interests, wants, needs, goods) The 
manipulator here should take notice of aspects of the target's 
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condition (noticeable changes, remarkable possessions, anything 
which looks as though the latter would want the speaker to notice 
and approve of it) (ibid.: 104). 
(20):Governor Romney, I'm glad that you 
recognize that Al Qaida is a threat; because a 
few months ago when you were asked what's 
the biggest geopolitical threat facing 
America, you said Russia, not Al Qaida 
(Obama in a candidates’ debate, LYNN 
University in October 22, 2012).  
Obama here notices the changes in Romney’s stance and 
approves this dramatic changes in the latter’s stand. 
2.   Seek agreement  
This strategy allows the speaker either to stress his agreement 
with the hearer and therefore to satisfy the hearer’s desire to be 
right, or to be corroborated in his opinions by raising safe topics; 
or to stress his Pseudo-agreement with the use of  the spatial 
diexis “then”(ibid: 112). 
(21):You see, I agree with Nick. There's got to be a right of 
recall for people who are in a constituency and find their MPs 
corrupt and parliament doesn't act. I agree with that.(Brown in 
first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News: online) 
This example shows a total agreement between the 
manipulator and the target. Brown, when showing his agreement 
with Nick, uses this politeness strategy in a clever way. 
3.   Presupposition manipulations 
The speaker presupposes something when he presumes that it 
is mutually taken for granted. He speaks as ifsomething is 
mutually assumed where it is not (ibid: 113).  Van Dijk (1989: 
31) asserts that this strategy, when used with the aim of 
manipulation, would have a specific persuasive power, and it is 
always oriented towards the “mental control” of the target. Pastor 
(2011: 59) in his turn, agrees with Van Dijk’s view confirming 
that this strategy, when employed, would be directed to the target 
and has the illocutionary force of offering and promising; acts 
which are at the service of manipulation, especially in political 
discourse.Consider the following example: 
(22):You wanted to protect the paymasters of the trade union. 
Paymasters, you wanted to protect Lord Ashcroft in his offshore 
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haven in Belize….I think that's a betrayal, I think that's a con. I 
think you deserve the right to sack your MPs when they're 
corrupt, but you also deserve a politics where we finally get the 
big money out of politics altogether (Clegg in first prime minister 
debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News: online) 
This is a clear example of presupposition manipulation. 
Participants in this debate are well acquainted with the corruption 
in the parliament. So, Clegg here accuses the target to protect the 
tycoons in the country while it is assumed that those corrupted 
people should be sacked as a mutual presupposed action.   
    b.Convey that S and H are cooperative 
This is the second major class of positive-politeness 
mechanismsaccording to Brown and Levinson (1987: 125). This 
mechanism reflects:  
the want to convey that the speaker and the addressee are 
cooperatively involved in the relative activity. If the 
speaker and the hearer are cooperating, then they share 
goals in some domain and thus to convey that they are 
cooperators can serve to redress H's positive-face want 
(ibid). 
This is done by claiming some kind of flexibility between the speaker's 
and hearer's wants as shown in the example below: 
(23):Number two, make sure that they are 
standing by our interests in Israel's security, 
because it is a true friend and our greatest 
ally in the region. Number three, we do have 
to make sure that we're protecting religious 
minorities and women because these 
countries can't develop unless all the 
population, not just half of it, is developing. 
Number four, we do have to develop their 
economic -- their economic capabilities 
(Obama in a candidates’ debate, LYNN 
University in October 22, 2012). 
This mechanism is cleverly used here by Obama as he wants to 
convey a message that he and the addressee are cooperatively involved in 
the same activity. They share goals in some domains such standing by 
America’s interest in Israel security and protecting religious minorities 
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and woman.This politeness mechanism, as a manipulative tool, can be 
achieved through out the following strategies: 
1.   Offer, Promise 
The speaker shows his good intention in satisfying the hearer's 
positive-face wants by using offers and promises strategy even if they 
are false (ibid).For example: 
(24):But we can't kill our way out of this 
mess. We're going to have to put in place a 
very comprehensive and robust strategy to 
help the -- the world of Islam and other parts 
of the world, reject this radical violent 
extremism, which is -- it's certainly not on 
the run (Romney in a candidates’ debate, 
LYNN University in October 22, 2012). 
2.   Include both S and H in the Activity  
 This can be done by using an inclusive 'we', when the manipulator 
really means 'you' or 'me', he can call upon the cooperative assumptions 
and thereby redress FTAs." (ibid.: 127). 
(25):We see in -- in Libya, an attack 
apparently by, I think we know now, by 
terrorists of some kind against -- againstour 
people there. Our hearts and -- and minds go 
out to them (Romney in a candidates’ debate, 
LYNN University in October 22, 2012). 
The repetition of the inclusive ‘we’ and its variant ‘our’ gives an 
indication that the manipulator involves himself with his target to show 
cooperative assumptions and to maintain FTAs. 
7.3    Impoliteness Theory and Manipulation 
   Within the domain of pragmatics, the concept of impoliteness 
comprises a new and interesting field of studies next to and 
complementing politeness studies .Impoliteness is considered to be a 
break from the hypothesized norms of a community of practice .It is 
attributed to a speaker on the basis of assessments of his intention and 
motivations, as Mills (2005:122) affirms. 
Primarily, the theory has first been proposed by Culpeper (1996) who 
defines impoliteness as "the opposite of politeness " (ibid: 344) . 
However, one can elaborate on this and consider impoliteness as an 
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exercise of power which is,in turn, expressed through language and 
cannot be explained without contextualization. Culpeper(ibid)argues that: 
A powerful participant has more freedom to be impolite because 
he/she can(a) reduce the ability of the less powerful participant to 
retaliate with impoliteness e.g. through the denial of speaking rights and 
(b) threaten more severe retaliation should the less powerful participant 
be impolite. (ibid:354) 
Posteriorly, Culpeper (2005: 355) whose initial work is based on 
Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness reformulates his model of 
impoliteness as "the parasite of politeness". Nevertheless, he (ibid) 
changes his model in order to incorporate with the discursive nature of 
social interaction. In this regard, impolitenesscan be seen to damage a 
person's identity and face. 
However, previous to the theory reformulation date, Culpeper et al 
(2003) importantly note that impoliteness is the use of strategies which 
are designed to attack the hearer's face and thereby cause social conflict 
and disharmony. Impoliteness, as such, by a specific kinds of behaviors 
in specific context (ibid:1550).  
In fact, the importance of context as invoked by Culpeper et al (ibid) 
can be seen as a confirmation to what Fraser and Nolan(1981:96) has 
previously assertedwith regard to context: 
No sentence is inherently polite or impolite we often take certain 
expressions to be impolite , but it is not the expressions themselves but 
the conditions under which they are used that determine the judgment of 
politeness. 
In line with Culpeper’s (ibid) claim that impoliteness is the opposite 
of politeness, Elen(2001:45) argues that politeness and impoliteness are 
two facets of the same coin.  Here, he means that there are always two 
sides to whatever kind of language behavior we engage in. One side is 
positive (politeness) and the other one is negative(impoliteness).as far as 
impoliteness is concerned, it is believed that it focuses on intention and 
reception. 
  In his turn, Mills(2003:124) disagrees with Culpeper and Elen asserting 
that impoliteness is not the opposite of politeness but she suggests that 
persons can deal with impoliteness by using the same analytical concepts 
as those relevant to the analysis of politeness. Furthermore, impoliteness 
can be expressed directly and indirectly;directness is often characterized 
as face-threatening acts (ibid). 
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  More recently, Culpeper(2011:63) explicates that impoliteness often 
involves a clash and conflict of behaviors associated with particular 
context and refers to inappropriate behavior. Thus,impoliteness, like 
manipulation, includes intentional face-attack. 
 The relationship between impoliteness and manipulation is revealed 
throughout the five impoliteness strategies as they proposed by 
Culpeper(1996: 356) that will be tackled in details in the next chapter. 
The impoliteness strategies used by speakers can be seen as implied 
strategies within the manipulation process. They are as follows: 
1. Bald on record impoliteness: is seen as typically being deployed 
where there is much face at sake and where there is an intention on 
the part of the speaker to attack the face of the hearer and/or where 
the speaker does not have the power to utter an impolite utterance. 
(26): I was shocked and I was sickened by what I saw. I'd been 
brought up to believe by my parents that you act honestly, and you 
act fairly and you act responsibly. As just as the bankers were 
irresponsible, so too were members of parliament (Brown in first 
prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News: online) 
This is a very good example about bald on record strategy.  
Brown here conveys little concern of face of the hearer using his 
power which authorizes him to have more freedom to be impolite. 
He is rude when he uses the words ‘shocked’ and ‘sickened’. And he 
shows himself that he was brought up in a family that teaches him 
that a man should all the time be honest in his work. That is why he 
shows his discontent in this tough way.  
2. Sarcasm or mock politeness: constitutes the use of individual or 
combined strategies and remains on the surface and appears to be 
appropriate. On the surface level, the utterances sound polite but 
their meaning is the opposite. Here, the face threatening acts are 
performed with the use of politeness strategies that are obviously 
insincere (ibid:49) 
(27):So, what -- what we need to do with respect to the Middle East 
is strong, steady leadership, not wrong and reckless leadership that is 
all over the map. And unfortunately, that's the kind of opinions that 
you've offered throughout this campaign, and it is not a recipe for 
American strength, or keeping America safe over the long haul 
(Obama in a candidates’ debate, LYNN University in October 22, 
2012). 
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Obama here is criticizing and mocking at Romney’s strategy 
which offered, according to Obama, wrong and reckless leadership 
to America. On the surface, this utterance seems polite while its 
meaning is totally impolite. As such, Obama performs a FTA as a 
strategy of manipulation to achieve his aim. 
3. Withhold politeness: In this strategy, the speaker does not perform a 
politeness act where the hearer would expect one. 
(28): This is not correct. The Taliban changed their tactics. We 
brought in helicopters from Iraq. We had to reprocess them because 
they were not suitable for the terrain in Afghanistan (Brown in first 
prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC.News: online). 
 Cameron, in the same debate, accuses the government that it does not 
provide enough helicopters required for the front line in Afghanistan. 
Brown expresses his severe reaction towards this accusation by saying 
frankly ‘this is not correct’. Thus he does not perform a politeness act 
where the hearer expect him to do so. 
In this respect, impoliteness strategies used by speakers can be seen 
as implied strategies within the manipulation process. In other words, 
manipulators use manipulative strategies that can be implicitly 
considered as impolite. Not to mention that manipulation itself, as a 
process, implies impoliteness since it damages the hearer’s face wants, 
for, as previously mentioned, manipulators aim to achieve goals that 
serve their interests best regardless of the hearer’s interests. 
Manipulation, like impoliteness, objects the acceptable and appropriate 
social behavior. 
7.4   Conversational Implicature and Manipulation 
Another pragmatic approach to manipulation concerns 
theconversational implicature(henceforth, CI),formulated by Grice (1975, 
1989), which requires contributionsto conversations to be truthful, 
relevant, informative and relatively complete. 
The term implicature came into use by the philosopher Pual Grice in 
his seminal article Logic and Conversation (ibid). Grice deals with the 
speaker's meaning from two perspectives: what is said and what is 
implicated. According to Meibauer(2006: 365), the first perspective 
belongs to the realm of semantics(truth-conditional semantics) since it 
can be assigned a truth condition within the true/false dialectic.What is 
implicated, on the other hand, could not be covered by semantics andit 
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belongs to the realm of pragmatics because it is part of the speaker's 
meaning (ibid). 
To give an idea about what is said as distinct from what is implicated, 
it might be useful to refer to Grice (1975, 1989). He (ibid: 47) suggests 
that speakers abide by a tendency toward being cooperative in their 
speech. This tendency is what Grice calls “TheCooperative 
Principle”which states: "Make your conversational contribution such as 
is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or 
direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged"  (ibid). The 
Cooperative Principle is supported by the four maxims of Quantity, 
Quality, Relevance, and Manner (Cf. Grice, 1975: 1989). 
  For Grice (ibid), any divergence or break of one or more of these 
maxims can lead into a break in the communication process but again 
taken the cooperative principle into their consideration, speakers 
understand that their partners are cooperative and the seeming break is in 
fact to tell more than what literal words can do (Cited in Levinson, 1983: 
102) 
  In manipulation process, implicature has its very potent nature 
where it enables the manipulator to maneuver and manipulate what s/he 
wants to convey indirectly. Manipulators (especially politicians) are 
always aware of the menace of their language so that they tend to express 
their messages implicitly to avoid being facilely judged for what is said.  
  For de Saussure (2005: 6), communication ismanipulative when the 
speaker retains some relevant information, or provides the 
correctinformation but in order for the target to conclude that he should 
behave in a way whichfavours the speaker’s interests, without being 
aware of it. Therefore, tomanipulate, is firstly, to communicate the 
relevance of things that are not relevant bythemselves, and / or retain 
actually relevant information (ibid). 
Additionally, the manipulatormay not respect the maxim of 
quality,either on the side of what is said, or on the side of what is 
implicated. The manipulator, in the strongest sense of theword, is always 
aware, at least to some extent, of the falsehood of what he says, implies 
or suggests (ibid). In brief, as Grice ( 1975,1989) has already assured, 
manipulative messages encoded by the target involve deviations from 
what can be considered rational and cooperative communication. They 
mislead targets by covertly violating the principles that underlie and 
guide conversational understanding. In doing so, manipulators use ISAs 
and/or rhetorical devices (ibid: 22). In other words, in manipulation 
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process, because the violation is not made apparent to the target, the 
latter is misled by his assumption that the manipulator is adhering to the 
CP and its maxims, hence, be manipulated. 
Based on this view,  Maillat& Oswald (2009: 350) have recently pointed 
out that manipulatorscovertly violate the Cooperative Principle and 
possibly the conversational maxims (ibid). 
7.5   Relevance Theory and Manipulation  
Relevance theory may be seen as an attempt to work out in details 
one of Grice’scentral claims that “an essential feature of most human 
communication, both verbaland non-verbal, is the expression and 
recognition of intentions” (Grice 1989: 18). 
  According to Sperber& Wilson  (1994: 2), relevance theory is based 
on a definition of relevance and two principles of relevance:a Cognitive 
Principle that human cognition is geared to the maximization 
ofrelevance, and a Communicative Principle that utterances create 
expectations ofoptimal relevance (ibid: 3). 
Sperber& Wilson (ibid: 249) state that an utterance is considered to 
be relevant when it connects with background informationavailable to the 
hearer in order to yield conclusions. For instance, by answering aquestion 
he had in mind, improving his knowledge on a certain topic, settling 
adoubt, confirming a suspicion, or correcting a mistaken impression 
(ibid).  For them (ibid: 251) an utterance is relevant to an individual 
when its processing in acontext of available assumptions yields a positive 
cognitive effect (ibid). 
These effects are supposed to be achieved with a minimum of 
processing effort on the part of the speaker. The motivation to involve 
cognitive effort is basedon the assumption of achievingthose effects in 
the hearer (ibid). 
For Blakemore (1994: 212), the relevance-theoretic account of 
cognition and communication has practicalimplications for pragmatic 
manipulation. A manipulative utterance meaning, to be linguistically 
encoded, must be contextually enriched (ibid). 
As far as the manipulator’s intention is concerned, Sperber and 
Wilson (1994:273)distinguish two levels of intention – an informative 
intention and acommunicative intention.The former makes certain 
assumptionsmanifestto the audience whereas the latter involvesonly the 
recognition of his informative intention. The informative intentionon the 
other hand is fulfilled whenever the intended assumptions are part ofthe 
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hearer’s cognitive environment (ibid) (see also Carston, 2002: 155).  
Accordingto Galasinski (2000: 22), manipulation can be manifested 
through the strategies of omission and/or commission: 
a. Manipulation by Omission     
According to Grice’s cooperation principle (1975, 1989), the speaker 
has tobe as informative as required by the communicative situation 
without being redundantor ambiguous. Within argumentation, the 
manipulator has a further meansof moulding his utterances by 
withholding information or expressing it in away that suits intended 
manipulative effects.Under ‘omission’ falls information that is withheld 
in spite of the fact that itcould have been relevant to the target in a 
particular situation. Omissioncan be passive, in which case the 
manipulator is simply withholding information. Bydoing so he is 
preventing the target from acquiring beliefs he would haveotherwise been 
able to establish. He is not trying to distort or present a falsereality, as 
Blass (2005: 190) states. 
(30):The chairman of the Republican 
Party thinks we ought to change a few 
things (Kerry in October 8, 2004 Debate. 
The Second Bush-Kerry Presidential 
Candidates ‘Debate). 
To avoid redundancy and ambiguity, the manipulator may resort 
to various strategies to mould his utterances by withholding information 
or expresses it in a way that suits his manipulative effect. And that what 
Kerry does in this speech. He doesn’t give full information about what 
are these few things. 
b.Manipulation by Commission 
Manipulation by commission happens if a manipulator is active; 
i.e.,his goal is tomake the hearer acquiring or continuing a belief that he 
intends the latter to accept. This can be done either explicitly or 
implicitly. Under explicitcommission fall lies, half-truths (distortions), 
evasions and equivocations. Underimplicit commission fall misleading 
underspecified explicatures and falseimplicatures (ibid).   
1.  Explicit Commission    
a. Lies: For Galasinski (2000), a lie is amessage intended 
andmeant to mislead the hearer. It is not so much the case that lies 
are objectively false, but that the manipulatormetarepresents a 
particular set of beliefs under a higherlevel representation of 
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disbelief in the truth or relevance of the lower level 
representationsthat he/she wants the hearer to accept as relevant. 
The lower levelrepresentation that he/she knows is not relevant 
information for the hearer iscommunicated ostensively, with the 
intention to make the latter believeand act upon his overt 
informative intention. The higher-level representationof disbelief 
is kept covert and so are the real facts thatmight have been 
relevantfor the hearer. All of this is fully intentional which rules 
out communicativeacts that are false, but not intended to mislead, 
as Blass (2005: 172) affirms. Below is an illustrative example: 
(31):We're going to have to put in place a 
very comprehensive and robust strategy to 
help the -- the world of Islam and other parts 
of the world, reject this radical violent 
extremism, which is -- it's certainly not on 
the run (Romney in a candidates debate, 
LYNN University in October 22, 2012). 
Romney conveys a message by which he intends to mislead the 
target. By doing so, he wants his words to be accepted as facts. Thus, 
makes his target believes and acts upon the manipulator’s (Romney’s) 
overt informative intention. All Muslims are sure that American 
Government does not work in favor of Islam and Muslims 
b. Half-truths and Distortions:  In his attempt to clarify the concept of 
‘half-truths’, Turner (1975: 36) claims that: “exaggerations are 
overstatementsgiving more information than required; half-truths, on 
the other hand,deceive by providing less information” (ibid). As such, 
they can be seen as ‘understatements’. 
Others have categorized the phenomenon of ‘distortions’ under 
exaggeration, minimization, or equivocationand define them as 
‘manipulation with truth’ (Metts, 1989: 18 &Taillard, 2000: 44).In line 
with those scholars, Buller&Burgoon(1994) view half-truths and 
distortions as having a part in pragmatic manipulation (ibid: 18). This 
view is also asserted by Burgoon, et al. (1996: 10) who propose that 
equivocation is characterized by ambiguity, indirectness or 
irrelevanceand depersonalization,which also includes evasion.The 
equivocation that playsa role in manipulation is like lies, exaggeration 
(overstatement) and half-truths (understatement). 
In a later work, Wilson andSperber (2000) point out that to be 
incompletely truthful often saves the manipulator processing effort and 
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might therefore be more relevant than veracious truth (ibid: 71). So, they 
(ibid: 98) add,there is a need to differentiate between phenomena that are 
used for achieving relevancemore easily than those that aremeant for 
deception. Simply because truth is not always what people are out 
for;they are after relevance. So what manipulation is about, is not about 
making the hearer believe untruth but to control the believes that he/she 
mayaccept and may act upon. manipulators may withhold relevant 
information from their target that he/she could accept as relevant (ibid: 
193). 
2.   Implicit information 
According to Blass (2005: 195), manipulation can also occur through 
implied information.This implied information can be on the propositional 
level (explicature)or it can be on the implicature level (misleading 
intended assumptions and/orconclusions). This strategy will not be 
included in the model of analysis for it is implicity exist within the theory 
of CI. 
7.6    Deictic Expressions (Indexicals) and Manipulation 
Levinson (1983:55) sees that deixis belongs to the domain of 
pragmaticsbecause it directly concerns the relationshipbetween the 
structure of language and the contextsin which they are used (ibid). 
According to him (ibid: 38),  deixiscan be typified into five categories: 
time, place, social, discourse andperson. Of these, only person deixis will 
be explained, on account of its relevance to the databeing analyzed. 
Moreover, he (ibid: 62) claims that person deixis is concerned with “the 
encoding role of participants in the speech event in which the utterance in 
question is delivered”(ibid). Then, He (ibid: 41) proceeds by further 
categorizing plural pronouns by encoding them as “we” and “they”. He 
makes adistinction between two types of the first person plural pronoun 
we. One is called the inclusivewe, which includes the speaker and the 
hearer when the speaker is one person asking anotherabout something 
they share or would both like to do. The other is the exclusive we, 
whichexcludes the speaker from the hearer (ibid). 
The use of   “I, you, we” continuum is an effort by the speaker to 
persuade the hearer to crossover to his ideological position, and 
accordingly, to achieve his manipulative purpose; since they are an 
effective means that enhances the legitimization of the speaker’s action, 
as Chilton and Schaffner(1997: 216) assert. For instance, the all-inclusive 
"we" can be used by the speaker to bring on to hisside, the hearer, in his 
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ideological and power positioning. "We", and its variants,"our", "ours" 
and "us", therefore represent, what Chilton (2004:140) defines as "the 
coalescence of the voice of the person with the voice of the people" 
(ibid). Consider the following example: 
(32):  We have all made personal and 
collective sacrifice not just to enthrone 
peace…. But also to consolidate our 
democracy…(Gordon Brown in first prime 
minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News: 
online) 
The use of person deixis to manipulate hearers has also been pointed 
out by Wilson (1990: 21)and Fairclough (2001: 33), who assert that its 
selection in political discourse is never arbitrary. Theuse of certain 
pronouns is strategic in the sense that politicians chose one deictic 
category rather than another toexpress the degree of their personal 
involvement. This is consonant with the manipulation of thefirst person 
plural we, which can designate the speaker and one or more other 
persons. Or it mayrefer to persons other than the speaker (ibid). in fact, 
Wilson (ibid: 87) and Fairclough (ibid: 22) confirm that manipulators 
(especially politicians)  use person deixis tomanipulate people, make 
alliances, attack, or express an ideological basis. Besides, identity and 
membership may be expressed through the use of personal deixisas a 
persuasive technique. This determines who belongs to the group and who 
does not. Typicalgroup members share common features that distinguish 
them from other groups. Manipulators tendto emphasize this difference 
through the categorization of groups using person deixis (ibid: 33). 
Accordingly, to achieve his manipulative goals, the manipulator utilizes 
certain deictic expressions which may create an elusive and deceptive 
effect on the hearer. In this regard, manipulators’ purposes ranging from 
personal to political, from persuasive tomanipulative,all are essentially 
dependent on both the context of production and the speaker'sintentions. 
Recently, Mey (2009: 54) donates deictic expressions the name of 
"indexicals" or "indexical expressions", he (ibid: 178) visualizes them as 
linguistic pointers which orientate reference in anutterance to the 
contextual coordinates of the utterance (ibid).as such, an indexical is 
generally understood to be the encoding ofthe spatiotemporal context and 
subjective experienceof the encoder in an utterance. In sum, the use of 
personal deixisby the speaker convince and subsequently manipulate the 
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hearer, influence him, persuade him to think like the manipulator and to 
accept his ideas unquestionably. 
7.7   Persuasive Argumentation and Manipulation 
    According to Eemeren, et al. (1997), argumentation is a reasonable 
activity that is socially and verbally meant to increase or decrease the 
hearers’ acceptance of a controversial position by presenting a reasonable 
justification for such a position (ibid: 1).   In argumentation, as 
Sperber(2000b: 5) argues, the speaker can give reasonsas to why it is 
worthwhile for the hearers to accept his assertion. Even ifthe hearer has 
no confidence in the manipulator, he can inspect the reasonsby logical 
means and will accept them if he recognizes their consistency (ibid). (see 
also: Eemeren et al. 2004; Cook, 2009; and  Nettle & Roque 2012). 
 For Reisigl and Wodak(2001: 44), argumentation is seen as one of 
five discursive ‘strategies’ involved in positive-Self and negative-Other 
representation. By ‘strategy’ it is meant an intentional plan of language 
practices, that is, systematic ways of using language, which serve to 
achieve particular social, political, psychological linguistic and/or 
manipulative effects (ibid). However, for other scholars, there is a 
confusion between ‘argumentation’ and ‘argument’. Toulmin (2003: 12), 
for instance, views argumentation  as including  many arguments and 
participants in a dispute. It is, for him (ibid), the line of thinking or 
reasoning to get to a logical conclusion and a discussion of different 
ideas. Similarly, Walton (2006: 2) differentiates between the term 
'argument' and 'argumentation' by claiming thatthe latter is a broad 
concept that denotes a dynamic process of connecting arguments together 
in a dialogue.  
According to Walton (2007),an argument manifests itself through the 
three fields of logic, rhetoric, and dialectic. Logic isthe science of 
reasoning that studies formal inferential links between setsof propositions 
designated as premises and conclusion of an argument (ibid: 23). 
Dialectic, usually taken to be a branch of logic, analyzes arguments 
givenin a text of discourse, including fallacious arguments, evaluating 
themas weak or strong by examining criticisms of them.  Rhetoric studies 
persuasive argumentsbased on the beliefs, commitments, or values of the 
target audience tobe persuaded (ibid: 31). In other words, one can say 
that logic explains the fact that arguments are products created by 
speakers as they are engaged in an argumentative situation; dialectic 
views argumentation as a process of cooperation between two 
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interlocutors; and rhetoric provides means of persuading others. Thus, the 
aim of rhetorical argumentation is to persuade others by picking premises 
that represent the valuesof the specific audience. (see also: Tindle, 2004: 
171). 
Persuasive argumentation, as Davidson (2001: 15) has previously 
asserted, combines the aims of argumentation with those ofpersuasion. 
The two aims do not conflict because one can, in certain cases, achieve 
achange in disposition to act simply by accepting a reasonable 
agreement. Howeverthese aims complement each other because those of 
persuasion go beyond thesimple support of a position, since they actually 
seek to provoke an action. In thisway, argumentation’s epistemic aim 
joins up with the pragmatic one of persuasiveeffectiveness (ibid). 
Furthermore, persuasive argumentation calls for a wide range of means 
(strategies) that are combined together. Such a combination therefore 
shows thecompatibility of means that are usually considered as opposed: 
those of argumentation, mainly reasonableness, and those to which 
persuasion is ordinarilyconnected, pathos and ethos, but also and more 
generally, the entirety of rhetoric’sresources (Nettle, 2011: 212). 
  Persuasive argumentation, as such,can be defined as 
thecommunicational process by which a speaker seeks to put the hearer 
in afavorable disposition that leads the latter to commit to an action 
presented asdesirable for him but in fact, it serves the speaker’s interests 
best. This disposition is obtained by a freely consented acceptance that 
shouldlead to a change in behavior. The acceptance results from the 
examination of thereasons given by the speaker, among which emotions 
can also play a role.  Accordingly, this leads one to claim that persuasive 
argumentation, as a process, resembles at a high level the manipulation 
process in the sense that in both processes, relatively; the same stages, 
strategies and intentional stance are exploited. The stages proposed in an 
earlier work by Eemeren&Hotlosser (2009: 482) are as follows:  
1. The confrontation stage:at this stagethe traditional tension between 
dialectic and rhetoric is down-played and the relation presented as 
complementary and useful (ibid: 483). 
2. The opening stage: each party in this stage is directed at creating the 
most advantageous (procedural and material) starting point, for 
instance, by calling to mind or eliciting helpful concessions from the 
other party (ibid: 485). 
3. The argumentation stage: here, each party that acts as a protagonist 
chooses a strategic line of defense that involves a selection from 
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available loci that suits that party best, and each party that acts as an 
antagonist chooses the line of attack that seems most effective in 
light of the dialectical situation (ibid: 489). 
4. The concluding stage:each party will direct its efforts toward achieving 
the conclusion of the discourse desired by that party, for instance, by 
pointing out what the consequence is of accepting a certain complex 
of arguments (ibid: 941). 
The persuasive strategies (appeals) used in argumentations are those 
proposed by Aristotle (1967), namely; logos, ethos and pathos.  
However, ‘persuasion’ has been differentiated from ‘manipulation’ by 
many scholars. Greimas&Courte´s (1979: 221) is the first who asserts the 
necessity of differentiating persuasion from manipulation, all the more 
sobecause the two concepts are often mixed or closely tied (ibid).Earlier, 
persuasion was recognized by Searle (1969)as a directive speech act in 
which the speaker’s purpose is to get the hearer to commit himself to 
some course of action. In other words, persuasion is an attempt to make 
the world matches the words (ibid: 66). 
For Conly (1990: 7), a persuasion situation involves the speakerwho 
attempts to persuade the hearer to take a certain action. Whether or not 
the hearer shouldaccept the speaker’s suggestion depends on information 
possessed by the speaker. Insuch a situation, the speaker often presents 
hard evidence to support his position (ibid).  
Lakoff (2005: 48) differently sees persuasion as the non-reciprocal 
attempt or intention of one party to change the behavior, feelings, 
intentions, or viewpoint of another by communicative means.The 
situation for Van Dijk (2006: 360) is different as he confirms that without 
the negative associations, manipulation could be a form of(legitimate) 
persuasion. Thecrucial difference in this case is that in persuasion the 
interlocutors are free tobelieve or act as they want, depending on whether 
or not they accept thearguments of the persuader, whereas in 
manipulation recipients are typicallyassigned a more passive role: they 
are victims of manipulation (ibid). This negativeconsequence of 
manipulative discourse typically occurs when the hearers areunable to 
grasp the real intentions or to see the full consequences of thebeliefs or 
actions advocated by the manipulator (ibid:366). 
This fact justifies Blass’s (2006: 195) claim that while it is possible in 
persuasion to have the persuasive intention beovert, and have the content 
of the informative intention covertly embeddedunder the intention of 
persuasion, the manipulative intention is always covert,and will have the 
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informative intention embedded under the manipulative intention (ibid). 
However, it seems that the embedded part of the persuasive intention is 
very differentfrom the deceptive manipulative higher order intention, 
which is always bad. 
To sum up, persuasion and manipulation are involved whenever there 
is a resistance to a particular issue of the receivers. Manipulation 
techniques tend to constraint and paralyze hearers’ freedom of thought 
and free will, and to a mental level, they can be a form of deprivation of 
liberty. 
7.8   Strategic Maneuvering and Manipulation 
The concept of strategic maneuvering has been defined by Eemeren 
and Houtlosser(2001: 151) as exponents: “attempt to make use of the 
opportunities available in the dialectical situation for steering the 
discourse rhetorically in the direction that serves their own interests 
best”. As far as the dealing with argumentation which is the basic field of 
SM is concerned, Toulmin(2001: 11) shows that there is a 
communicative gap betweena dialectical approach and a rhetorical 
approach in studying it. To bridge the gap between these two approaches, 
pragmatic techniques are used to show that rhetorical and dialectical 
approachesare, in fact, complementary in the sense that both aim at 
persuasion (ibid). 
 In fact, all theories of argumentation, and particularly those that are 
normative in force,stress the underlying reasonableness of the activity 
and ways in which this should beachieved and maintained. The 
relationship between SM and Manipulation can be revealed by shedding 
light on aspects of SM through which manipulation manifests itself. 
According to Eemeren (2010: 5), the analysis of strategic maneuvering 
divides the rhetoricaldimension into three inseparable aspects: topical 
potential, audience demand and presentational device. 
1. Topical Potential: This isthe first condition every strategic maneuver 
should meet to be considered reasonable.It pertains to the 
topicalchoice.Eemeren (2010: 111) explains that speakers, in their 
attempt to remain dialectically reasonable and at the same time 
rhetorically effective, make a topical selection that is most favorable 
to their position. That is to say, they will select materials from those 
available according to what they believe best advances their own 
interests. This also characterizes manipulation process; the 
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manipulator uses in the first stage this strategy to achieve goal(s) that 
serves his interests best. 
2.Audience Demand:  This is the second dimension, for optimal 
rhetorical result.The moves must in each stage of the discoursebe 
adapted to audience demand in such a way that they comply with the 
hearers’ good sense and preferences. Argumentative moves that 
areentirely appropriate to some may be inappropriate to others. In 
general, adaptationto audience demand will consist of an attempt to 
create empathy or ‘communion’(Emeren, 2010: 115). Moreover, 
strategic adaptation to audience demand may be achieved by 
quotingarguments the listeners agree with or by referring to 
argumentativeprinciples they adhere to (ibid: 201). 
Accordingly, for an optimal manipulation result, the manipulator must 
adapt to audience demand in such a way that his claims comply with 
the hearers’ good sense and preferences. It has also been asserted 
that showing awareness of the hearer’s face is the best means of 
adaptation which can be achieved through the politeness strategies.  
3. Presentational Devices: Another variety of strategic maneuver of 
special interest to pragma-dialectics is what Eemerenhas called a 
“presentational device”, “the phrasing of moves in the light of their 
discursive and stylistic effectiveness” (ibid: 242).Apresentational 
device a speakerutilizes is to present an argumentation in one way 
rather than another so as togain rhetorical advantage (ibid). 
Eemeren (ibid: 219) makes it clear that making use of presentational 
choices as manifestation of strategic maneuvering refers to utilizing the 
pragmaticstrategies as a variation to steer the discourse toward the 
achievement of certain communicative and interactionaleffects. Thus, 
one might claim that strategic maneuvering shares with manipulation 
process the exploitation of the presentational devices that help the 
manipulator achieving his manipulative goals. In addition, approached in 
this way, one can also see that strategic maneuvering shares with 
persuasive argumentation and manipulation the criterion of effectiveness 
and reasonableness.To maneuver or to manipulate, in both cases the 
speaker utilizes the power of speaking as well as the art of speaking to 
achieve his persuasive and/or manipulative goals. To put it more 
precisely, manipulatorsmaneuver in order to succeed in twisting the 
hearer’s world without being discovered. They attempt tomaneuver the 
target to perceive the intentional action (themanipulator’s goal) as the 
best available option in the current situation. Hence, they attempt to 
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achieve the motivating effect smoothly and elegantly. Because, in fact, in 
order to succeed in this regard, a lie has to seem true, an insincere 
promisemust seem authentic, a fallacy must look like a sound argument, 
a secondaryaspect has to appear as essential and deviant or reductive 
reading of a keywordmust look straightforward and appropriate. In short: 
what is negative has to besomehow disguised as something positive.  
One way of distinguishing in SM is what is referred to as ‘fallacy’ 
which is a kind of derailment of SM. Fallacy has a strong relationship 
with manipulation as shown below. 
7.8.1Fallacies and Manipulation  
  Walton (1995) defines fallacy as “an argument that falls short of 
some standard of correctness; as used in a context of a dialogue; but that, 
for various reasons, has a semblance of correctness about it in context; 
and poses a serious obstacle to the realization of the goal of a dialogue” 
(ibid: 23). Eemeren and Grootendorst (1999) on the other hand, consider 
fallacy as a derailment of strategic maneuvering. Recently,  
Eemeren&Houtlosser (2009) develop what Eemeren and Grootendorst 
(ibid) have said about fallacy explicating that strategic maneuvering has 
‘derailments’. Such derailments occur when a rule for critical discussion 
has been violated in the discourse. Viewed from this perspective, 
‘fallacies’ are considered to be violations of critical discussion rules that 
come about as derailments of strategic maneuvering (ibid: 14). 
Moreover, although in strategic maneuvering aiming for dialectical 
objectives and trying to reach rhetorical aims can go together, this does 
not mean that in practice there is always a perfect balance between 
pursuing the two objectives (ibid: 13).  Previously, Johnson (2000: 4) has 
seen that fallacies can sometimes pass unnoticed, however, he (ibid) 
explicates that fallacious argument is the one that violates one of a good 
argument rules. He (ibid: 208) specifies two types of fallacious 
arguments: those of a dialectical tier and others of the illative core. 
Dialectical tier is that part of the argument where the arguer is able to 
discharge obligations on his opponent (ibid: 209). Whereas illative core 
is a structure composed of the elements of premise, warrant and 
conclusion (ibid). Moreover, he (ibid: 265) provides four criteria for 
evaluating fallacious arguments of the illative core level: acceptability, 
truth, relevance and sufficiency. That is to say, if an argument constitutes 
a violation of one or more of these criteria or rules it will then be 
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considered as fallacious. As such, it is a pragmatic strategy used by 
manipulators to achieve their desired goals. 
8. Conclusions 
On the basis of what has been discussed above in relation to 
manipulation and its relationship with pragmatic theories and issues, it 
can be concluded that: 
1. Manipulation is a communicative pragmatic process in which the 
speaker (manipulator) maliciously and covertly intends to influence 
the beliefs, desires, emotions or behaviors of the hearer (target), 
usually against his best interests, by using certain manipulative 
pragmatic strategies. 
2. To achieve his influential goals, the manipulator resorts to fallacious 
arguments, breaches the maxim(s) of cooperation, uses certain 
pragmatic manipulative speech acts, conveys irrelevant information, 
utilizes certain deictic expressions, acts impolitely and/or 
strategically maneuvers his target. 
3. The persuasive appeals of (logos, ethos, and pathos) play a pivotal 
role in manipulation process. They best serve manipulators in 
achieving the desired manipulative end. 
4.The conclusions above indicate that manipulators make use of various 
pragmatic means and do not confine themselves to cognitive and 
behavioral ones which verifies the hypothesis that manipulation is 
essentially pragmatic in nature rather than cognitive or behavioral. 
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